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CHAPTER 12 
Consumer Law 
PAUL GITLIN° 
§12.1. Chapter 93A-Standing to Sue and Be Sued. During the 
Survey year Massachusetts appellate courts settled two questions con-
cerning standing under chapter 93 of the General Laws, the Consumer 
Protection Act. In Lantner v. Carson,l the Supreme Judicial Court 
ended the argument concerning the applicability of chapter 93A to a 
selling homeowner. The Appeals Court in Levings v. Forbes & Wallace, 
Inc.~ considered whether a business seller could invoke chapter 93A 
against a business customer. 
In Lantner, the plaintiffs brought an action against the private individ-
uals who sold them their home. In the sale agreement, the defendant 
had made several representations concerning the condition of the house 3 
and the quality of the water, which was supplied from the property's 
well. 4 Accepting these representations as true, the plaintiffs and the 
defendants completed the sale.5 Shortly after moving into the house, 
the plaintiffs experienced difficulties with the house and the well.6 The 
plaintiffs repaired the defects and then, pursuant to section 9( 3) of 
chapter 93A,i notified defendants of the problems and demanded relief.8 
When no offer to settle the matter had been received, the plaintiffs 
°PAUL GITLIN is a partner in the law finn of Gitlin & Emmer, Boston. 
§12.1. 1 374 Mass. 606, 373 N.E.2d 973 (1978). 
2 1979 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 2043, 396 N.E.2d 149. 
3 374 Mass. at 608, 373 N.E.2d at 975. In the purchase and sale agreement, 
the defendant had represented that (1) the visible damage to the second-floor 
ceiling was the result of a defective roof, which had already been repaired; and 
(2) that the second-floor fireplace was stuffed with paper to avoid drafts, but that 
it was otherwise in complete working condition. ld. 
4 ld. The purchase and sale agreement read in part: "This agreement so made 
... subject to the following: Water turned on, well functional, and water quality 
tests acceptable." ld. 
5 ld. 
G ld. at 608-09, 373 N.E.2d at 975. 
7 G.L. c. 93A, § 9( 3), provides in pertinent part: "At least thirty days prior 
to the filing of any ... action [under this section], a written demand for relief, 
identifying the claimant and reasonably describing the unfair or deceptive act or 
practice relied upon and the injury suffered, shall be mailed or delivered to any 
prospective respondent." Id. 
s 374 Mass. at 609, 373 N.E.2d at 975. 
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commenced an action under chapter 93A, alleging numerous misrepresen-
tations by the defendants and seeking treble damages, attorney's fees, 
and other relief.!! 
The Supreme Judicial Court rejected the plaintiffs' contention that the 
broad language of seotions 9 and 2 of chapter 93A encompassed strictly 
private transactions not undertaken in the ordinary course of a trade 
or business. Io Section 9 of chapter 93A provides a private right of 
action to any person who purchases property for personal use and thereby 
suffers a loss as a result of another's unfair or deceptive practice. Sec-
tion 2 proscribes unfair or deceptive practices "in the conduct of any 
trade or commerce .... " 11 Noting that the statute nowhere specifically 
defines "trade or commerce," the Court observed that in section 11 the 
words referred specifically to individuals acting in a business context,12 
The Court then determined that the legislature intended the same mean-
ing when using the phrase in section 2,13 It thereby confined the ap-
plication of section 2 to unfair practices occurring in a business context.H 
On this basis, the Court concluded that an individual selling his own 
home does not engage in trade or commerce and therefore is not sub-
ject to the provisions of chapter 93A.15 
In addition to finding support for its decision in narrow statutory 
analYSiS, the Court also found its conclusion consistent with the statute's 
broad protective purpose. 16 The Court emphasized the statute's goal 
of balanCing the relative positions of the partiesY The Court noted 
that the owner and potential purchaser in such a transaction stand in 
equal relation to one another. IS Giving the consumer-purchaser the 
weapon of chapter 93A would only unbalance this relationship.10 Hence, 
the Court concluded, allowing an individual home-buyer a cause of 
action under article 93A would only destroy the fundamental fairness 
that the legislature sought to achieve.20 
9 ld. at 607, 373 N.E.2d at 974. 
10 ld. at 610, 373 N.E.2d at 976. 
11 C.L.c. 93A, § 2. 
12 374 Mass. at 610, 373 N.E.2d at 976. 
13 ld. at 611, 373 N.E.2d at 977. 
14 ld. Some consumer law practitioners have argued that the nature of the 
transaction, rather than a generic description of the provider of the goods or 
services, should control the applicability of the law. Therefore, a sale of a home, 
even though not within the usual business praotices of the seller, would necessarily 
beoovered by the provisiOns of C.L. c. 93A. 
15 ld. at 607-08, 373 N.E.2d at 974-75. 
16 ld. at 612, 373 N.E.2d at 977. 
17 ld. 
18 ld. 
19 ld. 
20 Although a professional real estate broker was involved in the sale, the plaintiffs 
did not initiate a chapter 93A claim against him. The conclusion reached by the 
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After the Supreme Judicial Court settled the question of whether a 
non-business seller may be held liable under chapter 93A, the Appeals 
Court in Levings v. Forbes & Wallace, Inc. considered whether chapter 
93A reached commercial disputes between business organizations.21 In 
Levings, the plaintiff 22 had repaired a central air conditioning unit at 
the request of Forbes & Wallace. 23 Forbes and Wallace refused to pay 
the bill.24 Levings sued Forbes and Wallace under section 11 of chapter 
93A, which confers a right of action upon "[a]ny person who engages 
in the conduct of any trade or commerce . . . ." 25 Levings alleged 
that Forbes & Wallace never intended to pay for the work and that, 
in effeot, it had tricked him into working for it.26 This last allegation 
formed the foundation of Levings's claim of unfair or deceptive acts 
or practices. Forbes and Wallace argued in defense that only buyers, 
and not sellers, could avail themselves of remedies under section 11 of 
chapter 93A.27 Thus, it maintained, this section could not be utilized 
by a supplier of goods or services.28 
The Appeals Court found no support for Forbes & Wallace's conten-
tion in the statutory language of the Consumer Protection ACt.29 The 
court examined the language of section 9, which until recently had 
limited rights of action to purchasers and lessees.3o It contrasted this 
section with the broad entitlement contained in section 11, where no 
such limitation is present. 31 The court concluded that the restrictions 
encompassed in section 9 could not by implication be oonferred upon 
section 11.32 
The result of the Lantnel' and Levings decisions is both a broadening 
and a narrowing of the class of plaintiffs who may avail themselves 
of the remedies of the Consumer Protection Act. Lantner limits this 
Court would not have been applicable to such a party. The Court's decision places 
real estate brokers in a very tenuous position because their clients, the sellers, are 
bound to a much less stringent standard of conduct than are the brokers. 
21 1979 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 2043, 396 N.E.2d at 151. 
22 Willard S. Levings was designated as a trustee, for Trane, the plaintiff. ld. 
23 ld. 
24 ld. at 2044, 396 N.E.2d at 151. 
25 C.L. c. 93A, § 11. 
26 1979 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 2044, 396 N.E.2d at 151. 
27 ld. at 2049, 396 N.E.2d at 153. 
28 ld. 
29 ld. 
30 ld. C.L. c. 93A, § 9, was amended during the Survey year by chapter 406 
of the Acts of 1979. For a discussion of these recent amendments, see § 8 infra. 
31 Whereas the old version of section 9 spoke of "[a]ny person who purchases 
or leases goods, services or property ... ," section 11 refers to "[a]ny person who 
engages in the conduct of any trade or commerce .... " C.L. c. 93A, § 11. 
32 1979 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 2049, 396 N.E.2d at 153. For further dis-
cussion of LeVings, see § 3 infra. 
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class by restrioting chapter 93A actions to consumers injured in a busi-
ness tTansaction.33 Levings, on the other hand, broadens the class of 
business consumers to include sellers as well as buyers. 34 Both cases 
are significant for clarifying who may avail themselves of the protec-
tions of chapter 93A. . 
§12.2. Chapter 93A-Standards for Detennining Violationso-Con-
sumer Actions. As any attorney who has ever filed an action under 
chapter 93A, or has ever defended against such an action, can attest, 
in most cases the attorney's estimate of the chances for success is, at 
best, an educated guess. Of course, these guesses become more edu-
cated as the judiciary shapes the limits of the law's prohibitions. During 
this Survey period ,the Supreme Judicial Court in two opinions con-
tinued this process of shaping the boundaries of chapter 93A.l 
In Schubach v. HOUisehold Finance Corp.,2 the plaintiffs, residents of 
Holyoke, had borrowed money from the defendant at its Holyoke of-
fice. 3 When the plaintiffs failed to pay the amount due, the defendant 
filed a suit in Boston Municipal Court.4 The plaintiffs alleged that by 
filing suit in Boston, rather than in a court in Holyoke, the defendants 
had engaged in an unfair or deceptive act in violation of chapter 93A.o 
The plaintiffs complained that the defendant had a policy to file suit 
in a forum inconvenient to the plaintiffs in order to precipitate default 
judgments, to make defense of the action more difficult, and to secure 
judgments more favorable to the Household Finance Corporation than 
would otherwise be thecase.6 Household Finance moved to dismiss, 
asserting that there could be no finding of unfairness or deception when 
their choice of forum was within the parameters created by law.7 The 
trial judge denied the motion, and the Supreme Judicial Court granted 
direct appellate review. 8 
The Court, in upholding the .trial judge's denial of the motion to 
dismiss, considered interpretations given by federal courts and the Fed-
33 Id. at 646, 373 N.E.2d at 976. 
34 1979 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 2049, 396 N.E.2d at 153. 
§12.2. 1 This process commenced with Commonwealth v. DeCotis, 366 Mass. 234, 
316 N.E.2d 748 (1974), and oontinues unabated. See Slaney v. Westwood Auto, 
Inc., 366 Mass. 688, 322 N.E.2d 768 (1975). 
2 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1153, 376 N.E.2d 140. 
3 Id. at 1154, 376 N.E.2d at 141. 
4 Id. 
old. 
6 Id. 
7 C.L. c. 332, § 2, as amended by Acts of 1975, c. 836, § 2. Section 2 provides 
that a complaint may be filed in the "oounty where one of the parties lives or has 
his usual place of business." Id. Since the defendant's main office is located in 
Boston, aoomplaint oould be filed in Suffolk County. 
8 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1154, 376 N.E.2d at 140. 
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eral Trade Commission to the phrase "unfair or deceptive acts or prac-
tices." n The Court noted that the Federal Trade Commission had 
issued cease and desist orders in matters involving the commencement 
of consumer collection suits in courts far from the consumer's home on 
the grounds that such act constitutes unfair practice.10 In addition, the 
Court noted that a Federal Trade Commission order involving a prac-
tice substantially similar to the conduct complained of in Schubach had 
been enforced by the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals,11 On this 
basis, the Supreme Judicial Court rejected the argument that "an act 
or practice which is authorized by a statute can never be an unfair or 
deceptive act or practice under §2( a) of G.L. c. 93A." 12 In so doing, 
the Court enunciated the standard to be applied when determining 
whether a practice is deceptive. It stated that "[t]he circumstances of 
each case must be analyzed, and unfairness is to be measured not 
simply by determining whether particular conduct is lawful apart from 
G.L. c. 93A but also by analyzing the effeot of the conduct on the 
public." l:i The Court noted that while a court in making such an 
assessment should consider whether a form of conduct was permitted 
by statute or common law, this factor would not be conclusive on the 
issue of fairness. H Hence, the Court ruled that since Household Finance 
had based its motion to dismiss solely on a ground which is not con-
clusive on the issue of fairness, the judge's order denying the motion 
to dismiss was correct.15 
An opportunity to apply the standard enunciated in Schubach was 
provided in Mechanics National Bank of Worcester v. Killeen.16 Killeen 
9 ld. at 1155, 376 N.E.2d at 141. C.L. c. 93A, § 2(b), as amended by Acts 
of 1978, c. 459, § 2, states: 
It is the intent of the legislature that in construing paragraph (a) of this sec-
tion in actions brought under sections four, nine and eleven, the courts will be 
guided by the interpretations given -by the Federal Trade Commission and the 
Federal Courts to section 5( a) (l) of the Federal Trade Commission Act (15 
U.S.C. 45(a)(I», as from time to time amended. 
10 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1155, 376 N.E.2d at 141. See In re Commercial 
Servo Co., 86 F.T.C. 467 (1975); In re Montgomery Ward & Co., 84 F.T.C. 1337 
(1974). The FTC's cease and desist orders required the defendants to s'top 
instituting coll&tion suits in any county other than the county in which the con-
sumers resided or that in which the contract was executed. 
11 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1156, 376 N.E.2d at 141. See Spiegel, Inc. v. FTC, 
540 F.2d 287 (7th Cir. 1976), where the court noted that the Supreme Court 
left no doubt that the Federal Trade Commission had the authority to prohibit 
conduct as unfair even though it was legal. ld. at 292 (citing FTC V. Sperry & 
Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233 (1972)). 
12 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1159, 376 N.E.2d at 142. 
13 Id. 
14 ld. 
lIi ld. 
16 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. 129, 384 N.E.2d 1231. 
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was indebted to the bank on three notes executed in 1974,17 All three 
notes were secured by stock in a company traded on the New York 
Stock Exchange.1s Between April and June 1974, the value of this 
stock declined substantially.19 The bank requested that Killeen pledge 
additional collateral because the value of the stock no longer adequately 
protected the bank's position.20 To comply, Killeen executed a mort-
gage on his home.21 Five days after the mortgage was executed, the 
bank's loan committee decided to sell the stock.22 An order to sell was 
placed the next day, and the shares were sold during that day and the 
next two days. At no time before these sales did the bank inform 
Killeen that the due dates of the notes had been accelerated, or that 
these notes were then due.23 
After receiving notice from Killeen purporting to cancel the mortgage 
and a demand letter seeking damages for wrongful sale of the stock, 
the bank filed a complaint seeking declaratory relief.24 The complaint 
sought a determination that the mortgage could not be cancelled. Kil-
leen counterclaimed, alleging, inter alia, violations of .chapters 93A and 
140C.2U The trial judge ruled that the bank had violated its contract 
by selling the stock in the manner it did, but found that the mortgage 
was valid, and that there had been no violations of chapters 93A or 
140G26 
The Court, interpreting the underlying promissory notes executed by 
the parties, concluded that the bank had no right to sell the stock until 
notice was given to Killeen that the notes were due, and Killeen was 
given a reasonable opportunity to pay the amount due.27 Having 
decided that stock sale was improper, the Court then turned its atten-
tion to the question of whether ,this improper conduct constituted the 
basis for a violation of chapter 93A. The Court ooncluded that it did 
17 ld. at 130, 384 N.E.2d at 1233. 
jS ld. at 130, 384 N.E.2d at 1234. 
19 ld. at 131, 384 N.E.2d at 1234. 
20 ld. at 132, 384 N.E.2d at 1234. 
21 ld. Killeen asserted that the bank obtained the mortgage by representing. that 
the stock would not be sold if the additional collateral was pledged. The trial 
judge found that no such assurance was given. ld. at 138, 384 N.E.2d at 1237, 
22 ld. at 132, 384 N.E.2d at 1234 . 
. 23 ld. at 142, 384 N.E.2d at 1237. This notice of cancellation was given well 
after the period of time allowed by C.L. c. 14OC, § 8, had expired. This section 
requires a party to cancel within three days following thegrartting of the mortgage. 
See C.L. c. 140C, § 8. 
24 1979, Mass. Adv. Sh. at 133, 384 N.E.2d at 1235. The demand letter was 
filed pursuant to C.L. 93A, § 9. 
25 ld. C.L. c. 140C relates to consumer credit cost disclosure. 
26 ld. at 134, 384 N.E.2d at 1235. 
27 ld. at 136-37, 384 N.E.2d at 1236. 
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not.28 Citing Schubach, the Court declared that "[ilust as every lawful 
act is not thereby automatically free from scrutiny as to its unfairness 
under c. 93A, . . . so not every unlawful act is automatically an unfair 
(or deceptive) one under C.L. c. 93A." 29 The Court employed the 
same approach that it used in Schubach, namely, analyzing all the cir-
cumstances of the case.30 It noted that the bank's concern for its 
security was reasona;ble and that the bank had no knowledge of any 
other assets that Killeen possessed.31 Thus, after balancing the equities 
in the relationship of the parties, the Court ruled that there was no 
unfair act or practice in the bank's sale of the stock,32 
In Schubach and Mechanics National Bank, the Court made it clear 
that it would not consider every unlawful action in a consumer context 
to be a violation of chapter 93A.33 At the same time, it emphasized 
that an act, otherwise legal, could nevertheless constitute an unfair or 
deceptive practice within the meaning of chapter 93A.34 These cases 
define the current boundaries of the Consumer Protection Act. Whether 
these boundaries can be of any practical assistance to the practitioner 
is a matter best left to ,conjecture, because each case must be decided 
upon its unique circumstances. 
While the standard enumerated in the previous two cases is important 
in determining potential violations of chapter 93A in the absence of 
either federal precedents 35 or of specific violation of the rules and regu-
lations promulgated by the Attorney Ceneral,36 in one class of cases 
the existence of chapter 93A violations is much more easily deteImined. 
One such case is Heller v. Silverbranch Construction Corp.,37 decided 
by the Supreme Judicial Court during this Surrvey period. Heller in-
volved allegations by purchasers of a private home that the real estate 
28 ld. at 138, 384 N.E.2d at 1237. 
29 ld. at 139, 384 N.E.2d at 1237. 
30 ld. 
31 ld. at 140, 384 N.E.2d at 1237. 
32 ld. 
33 ld. The Court in Mechanics Nat'l Bank had no reason to discuss the im-
plicatiOns of 940 C.M.R. § 3.16, which states that an act violates G.L. c. 93A if 
"[ilt fails to comply with existing statutes, rules, regulations or laws meant for the 
protection of the public's health, safety, or welfare promulgated by the Common-
wealth or any political subdivision thereof intended to provide the consumers of 
this Commonwealth protection." ld. 
34 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 139, 384 N.E.2d at 1237. 
35 G.L. c. 93A, § 2 (b), states that the oourts should be guided by interpreta-
tions of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.c. § 45(a)(l) (1976). 
36 G.L. c. 93A, § 2( c), enables the Attorney General to make rules and regula-
tions interpreting the provisions of subsection 2( a). These rules and regulations 
are found at 940 C.M.R. §§ 3.00-11.00. 
37 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2850, 382 N.E.2d 1065. For a discussion of other 
aspects of this case, see § 4 infra. 
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brokers and the builder had misrepresented the property.38 The plain-
tiffs, residents of Illinois, came to Massachusetts to purchase a home. 
They contacted a broker who showed them numerous houses.39 During 
one house visit, they noticed running water on the property and told 
the broker that they were not interested in any property that had any 
wa·ter on it.40 The broker then directed them to a house that was 
constructed and owned by the defendant, Silverbranch. The plaintiffs 
decided to purchase the house. Before signing the purchase and sale 
agreement, Mrs. Heller asked the president of Silverbranch if there was 
good drainage on the land. He responded in the affirmative.41 The 
transaction was completed, and the Hellers moved into their new house 
two months later. On their arrival at the house, they noticed standing 
water on the property. They called the president of Silverbranch, who 
acknowledged that there was a drainage problem, but refused to assume 
the costs of cure.42 
The plaintiffs sent a written demand for relief to both Silverbranch 
and the brokers.43 Silverbranch made no offer of relief during the en-
suing thirty days, and the plaintiffs initiated a suit claiming violations 
of chapter 93A.44 The trial judge entered judgment for the brokers as 
against the plaintiffs,45 and for the plaintiffs as against Silverbranch.46 
The trial judge awarded damages in the amount of twice the cost of 
cure plus attorney's fee, interest, and costS.47 Silverbranch appealed, 
arguing, inter alia, that there could be no finding of a violation of chap-
ter 93A when the buyers of real property accepted a deed in full satis-
faction of a purchase and sale agreement, when the defendant had not 
committed fraud, had violated no warranties, and when there was in-
sufficient evidence of negligence.48 
38 ld. at 2850, 382 N.E.2d at 1067-68. 
39 ld. at 2851, 382 N.E.2d at 1068. 
40 ld. 
41 ld. at 2852, 382 N.E.2d at 1068. 
42 ld. at 2853, 382 N .E.2d at 1069. 
43 The plaintiffs sent the demand note pursuant to C.L. c. 93A, § 9(3), which 
requires that such note be written and delivered to a prospective defendant at 
least 30 days prior to the commencement of any action under this section. The 
demand for relief must identify the claimant, state the injury suffered, and must 
describe the unfair and deceptive practices which were relied upon. 
44 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2853, 382 N.E.2d at 1069. 
45 ld. at 2850, 382 N.E.2d at 1068. Since the plaintiffs did not appeal this entry 
of judgment, the underlying reasons for the judge's finding of no liability for the 
brokers was not discussed by the Court. 
46 ld. 
47 ld. at 2850-51, 382 N.E.2d at 1068. The issues of multiple damages and 
attorney's fees were appealed and discussed in the Court's decision. For a review 
of the CoUIt's conclusions relative to these issues, see § 4 infra. 
48 ld. at 2851, 382 N.E.2d at 1068. 
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The Supreme Judicial Court rejeoted the defendant's appeal, finding 
that its entire theory, based as it was on arguments relevant to common 
law, was without merit as a defense to allegations of unfair or deceptive 
acts under chapter 93A.4n The Court noted that by focusing solely on 
common law theories of liability, the defendant had ignored prior deci-
sions of the Supreme judicial Court:;o and of the United States Supreme 
Court which held that consumer protection statutes create new sub-
stantive rights.51 Such rights are established by making unlawful that 
conduct which was previously not deemed unlawful under the common 
law. r.:! Thus, rather than focusing on common law theories to determine 
the application of chapter 93A, the Court relied on the policy surround-
ing chapter 93A and the facts of the case to determine the existence 
of unfair or deceptive acts and praotices.53 The lower court had con-
cluded that Silverbranch had granted its president the authority to enter 
into an agreement with the Hellers for the sale of the property and 
to make representations about that property. 54 The trial judge also 
found that the preSident's failure to disclose the drainage problem 
violated paragraph XV of the Attorney General's Rules and Regula-
tions.";; After reviewing the record, the Court found sufficient evidence 
to support the trial judge's findings and thus affirmed the lower court's 
judgment concerning Silverbranch's general liability.56 
§12.3. Chapter 93A-Standards for Determining Violations-Busi-
ness Actions. Section 9, relating to non-business consumers, and section 
11, relating to business consumers, both create a right of action to redress 
"unfair or deceptive act( s) or practice( s)" used in the course of a trade 
or business. 1 Two decisions 2 handed down during the Survey year 
49 ld. at 2855, 382 N.E.2d at 1069. 
50 ld. at 2856, 382 N.E.2d at 1069 (citing Dodd v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 
373 Mass. 72, 305 N.E.2d 802; Slaney v. Westwood Auto, Inc., 366 Mass. 688, 322 
N.E.2d 768 (1975); and Commonwealth v. DeCotis, 366 Mass. 234, 316 N.E.2d 
748 (1974)). 
51 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2856, 382 N.E.2d at 1069. 
52 ld. 
53 ld. at 2856, 382 N.E.2d at 1070. 
541d. 
55 ld. 940 C.M.R. § 3.16(2), paragraph XV, provides that an act or practice vio-
lates C.L. c. 93A, § 2, if "A. It is oppressive or otherwise unconscionable in any 
respect ... " or "B. Any person or other legal entity subject to this act fails to disclose 
to a buyer or prospective buyer any fact, the disclosure of which may have influenced 
the buyer or prospective buyer not to enter into the transaction .... " ld. 
5G 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2851, 382 N.E.2d at 1068. 
§12.3. 1 Section 9 provides a right of aotion for "[a]ny person, other than a 
person entitled to bring action under section eleven of this chapter, who has been 
injured by another person's use or employmet of any method, act or practice 
declared to be unlawful by seotion 2 . . . ." C.L. c. 93A, § 9. Section 11 confers 
,the same right upon "[a]ny person who engages in the conduct of any trade or 
commerce. and who suffers any loss of inoney or property . . .." ld., § 11. 
9
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indicate that courts are inclined to impose different standards for deter-
mining violations of these two sections. The imposition of different 
standards is understandable in light of the overall perception that chap-
ter 93A was enacted to readjust the inequities that have evolved in a 
commercial world. It is assumed that a business requires less protection 
than a consumer and that, therefore, a more stringent standard is ap-
propriate for section 11 claims. 
The Appeals Court in Levings v. Forbes & Wallace, Inc.3 imposed a 
much stricter standard for what constitutes unfair or deceptive conduct 
among business consumers than had been adopted in any previously 
decided case. Levings arose out of an action to recover on a contract 
for materials sold and services rendered by the plaintiff at the request 
of the defendant Forbes & Wallace.4 The plaintiff had repaired the 
air conditioning in the defendant's department store. Subsequently, the 
defendant refused to pay the plaintiff's bill,5 The plaintiff asserted that 
Forbes & Wallace, from the moment it ordered the work, never intended 
to pay for its labor and materials.G This assertion was the basis of the 
plaintiff's claim that the defendant had indulged in unfair or deceptive 
praotices in violation of chapter 93A.7 
The Appeals Court ruled that Forbes & Wallace's conduct did not 
amount to a violation of chapter 93A.S In reaching its decision, the 
court applied the criteria established in PMP Associates v. Globe News-
paper CoY Using these criteria the court looked for "conduct which 
is (1) within at least the penumbra of some common law, statutory, or 
other established concept of unfairness; (2) . . . is immoral, unethical, 
oppressive or unscrupulous .... "]0 The court found that the defend-
ant's refusal to pay for goods and services was based upon a genuine 
dispute concerning the amount of the bill.11 It ruled that such a refusal 
did not amount to deceptive conduct within the meaning of chapter 
93A. The court stated ,that in order to violate chapter 93A, "[t]he ob-
2 Schubach v. Household Fin. Corp., 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1153, 376 N.E.2d 
140; Levings v. Forbes & Wallace, Inc., 1979 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 2043, 396 
N.E.2d 149. 
3 1979 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 2043, 396 N.E.2d 149. For discussion of 
another aspect of this case, see § 1 supra. 
4 1979 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 2043, 396 N.E.2d at 151. 
r; ld. at 2044, 396 N.E.2d at 15l. 
6 ld. 
7 ld. 
SId. at 2051, 396 N.E.2d at 154. 
!) 366 Mass. 593, 321 N.E.2d 915 (1975). 
10 1979 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 2050, 396 N.E.2d at 153 (citing 29 Fed. 
Reg. 8325, 8355 (1964». 
11 1979 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 2050, 396 N.E.2d !lit 153. 
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jectionable conduct must attain a level of rasoality that would raise an 
eyebrow of someone unused to the rough and tumble of the world of 
commerce." 12 
The standard applied by the Levings court would appear to create 
a sophisticated businessman test for violations of section 11, thereby 
cementing the status quo of the pre-chapter 93A era. Both the Appeals 
Court 13 and the Supreme Judicial Court 14 have recognized that the 
philosophical basis for the enactment of chapter 93A is the principle 
that one party should not unfairly take advantage of another party. It 
is not generally conceded that such a search for parity would be accom-
plished by using a test as difficult as that proposed in Levings. Clearly, 
this principle should be applicable to business and non-business parties 
alike. Indeed, the Appeals Court in Levings recognized that such un-
fair advantage could be taken in a business context. As the court wryly 
observed, "[i]t does not ... require an exceptionally lively imagination 
to conjure circumstances under which an economically powerful busi-
ness in the capacity of a buyer might act unfairly in relation to a small 
business in the capacity of a seller of goods or services." 15 It is unlikely 
that such a search for parity can be accomplished by using a test as 
difficult as that proposed by the Levings court. 
§12.4. Chapter 93A-Multiple Damages. Before filing an action 
under chapter 93A, a plaintiff, pursuant to section 9( 3 ), must first send 
a demand letter to the defendant describing the specific unfair practices 
alleged and the injuries suffered. 1 The party receiving the demand 
letter has thirty days in which to respond by a written offer of settle-
ment.2 If such an offer is made and rejected, damages in any subsequent 
action will be limited to the relief offered, pmvided that the court finds 
the offer to be reasonable.3 If the defendant fails to make such an 
offer of settlement, section 9( 3) authorizes the judge to award a multiple 
of two to three times plaintiff's actual damages.4 The award of multiple 
damages may be made under either of two circumstances: (I) if the 
court finds a wilful or knowing violation of chapter 93A, section 2; or 
( 2) if the court finds that the refusal to offer a settlement upon demand 
12 ld. 
13 Linhares Co. v. Reliance Ins. Co., 4 Mass. App. Ct. 617, 357 N.E.2d 313 
(1976). 
14 Commonwealth v. DeCotis, 366 Mass. 234, 316 N.E.2d 748 (1974). 
15 1979 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 2049, 396 N.E.2d at 153. 
§12.4. 1 C.L. c. 93A, § 9( 3). The letter must be sent at least 30 days prior to 
the filing of the action. ld. 
2 ld. 
ald. 
4 ld. 
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was made in bad faith with knowledge or reason to know that section 
2 has been violated.5 
During the Survey year the Supreme Judicial Court considered the 
issue of multiple damages in Heller v. Silverbranch Construction Corp.6 
In Heller the defendant had declined ,to respond to the plaintiff's demand 
letter.' Finding that the defendant had actual knowledge that its acts 
were unlawful when it refused to offer a settlement,S the Court upheld 
the trial judge's award of multiple damages as just punishment for 
conduct that was "precisely the type that § 9( 3) was designed to deter." 0 
In the course of its decision, the Court discussed the circumstances 
under which multiple damages will be awarded. It observed that the 
first circumstance under which such damages are granted required little 
explanation. This ground for awarding multiple damages was designed 
to deal with "callous and intentional violations" of chapter 93A.10 The 
Court viewed the second ground as an attempt by the legislature "to 
promote prelitigation settlements by making it unprofitable for the de-
fendant either to ignore the plaintiff's request for relief or to bargain 
with the plaintiff with respect to such relief in bad faith." 11 Thus, the 
standard changes from one of wilfulness or knowledge in the first circum-
stance to one of knowledge or reason to know in the second. With 
respect to the knowledge or reason to know requirement of the second 
ground for awarding multiple damages, the Court ruled that the time 
for ascertaining this knowledge is after receipt of the demand letter 
and not at the time of the alleged violation.12 The Court noted that 
the standard is an objective one and "requires the defendant to investi-
gate the facts and consider the legal precedents." 13 
Prior to this decision defendants could have argued that at the time 
the alleged aot was committed they did not possess the requisite reason 
to know that their actions were in violation of chapter 93A. Had the 
Heller Court aocepted this argument fixing the time of knowledge at 
the time of the alleged violation, motivation for pre-litigation settlement 
would have been conSiderably reduced. By fixing the time for deter-
mining knowledge as the point when the demand letter is received, 
5 ld. 
G 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2850, 382 N.E.2d 106.5. For a discussion of other 
aspects of this case, see § 2 supra. 
7 ld. at 2853, 382 N.E.2d at 1069. 
sId. at 2859, 382 N.E.2d at 1070-71. 
n ld. at 2859, 382 N.E.2d at 1071. 
10 ld. at 2858, 382 N .E.2d at 1070 (citing Rice, New Private ReTMdies for 
Consumers: the AmendTMnt of Chapter 93A, 54 MASS. L.Q. 307, 318 (1969». 
11 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2858, 382 N.E.2d at 1070. 
12 ld. 
13 ld. 
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the Court is requiring the defendant to consider his actions in the light 
of the allegations made by the plaintiff. The plaintiff's attorney should 
therefore carefully draft demand letters so that they reasonably inform 
the defendant of the legal bases for the plaintiff's claim. The defendant's 
attorney should use the thirty-day period provided in the statute to 
review thoroughly the allegations and the law, including the rules and 
regulations promulgated by the Attorney General. 
Since section 11, which deals with a business plaintiff, contains no 
comparable provision for pre-litigation settlement of claims,14 the result 
in Heller is not available to a business plaintiff. Multiple damages are 
available only if the plaintiff can prove that the aot was a wilful or 
knowing violation of section 2.1" This difference between awards avail-
able under sections 9 and 11 of chapter 93A was confirmed in a case 
decided by the Supreme Judicial Court during the latter days of this 
Survey period. 
Linthicum v. Archambault 16 resulted from a claim ,that the defend-
ant, a roofing contractor, had breached his warranty by failing to re-
shingle the plaintiff's duplex house "in a workman-like manner according 
to standard practices." 17 After receiving no satisfaction from a demand 
letter, the plaintiff commenced actions based upon breach of contract, 
breach of implied warranty, and violation of chapter 93A.18 The triaJ 
court allowed the plaintiff to recover only on the basis of breach of 
warranty. It refused to award damages under chapter 93A.19 
On appeal, the Supreme Judicial Court reversed the trial court's deci-
sion to deny relief under chapter 93A, finding that such relief "is in 
addition to, and not an alternative to, traditional tort and contraot 
remedies." 20 The Court remarked that the trial judge'S finding of a 
material and substantial breach of warranty oonstituted an ample basis 
for recovery under chapter 93A.21 It held, however, that on these faots 
the plaintiff's status as a business plaintiff prevented reoovery of mul-
tiple damages.22 Any relief provided by chapter 93A for persons en-
gaged in "any trade oroommerce" must be sought under section 11, 
14 C.L. c. 93A, § 11. 
15 ld. 
16 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2661, 398 N.E.2d 482. 
17 ld. at 2662, 398 N.E.2d at 484. 
18 ld. at 2661, 398 N.E.2d at 484. 
In ld. at 2662 n.2, 398 N.E.2d at 484 n.2. The trial judge held "that the 
insertion of a M.C.L.A. Chapter 93A Count or Consumer Protection Act CouIllf: in 
said Complaint was unnecessary to secure adequate relief for said plaintiff" since the 
court had already found in favor of the plaintiff on her contract claim. ld. 
20 ld. at 2663, 398 N.E.2d at 485. 
21 ld. at 2667, 398 N.E.2d at 487. 
22 ld. The plaintiff had sought relief under section 9 as a consumer who con-
tracted with the defendant for personal, family, or household purposes. The Court, 
13
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rather than section 9.23 The Court observed that by its tenns section 
11 limits a business plaintiffs recovery to actual damages, unless there 
is a wilful or knowing violation of section 2.24 Since the trial judge 
had found that the defendant's actions were not wilful, intentional, or 
deliberate, the Court concluded that multiple damages were not avail-
able to this plaintiff.25 In so ruling, the Court has made it likely that 
a business plaintiff bringing an action under section 11 of chapter 93A 
will have a more difficult time securing a multiple damage award than 
a non-business plaintiff seeking recovery under section 9.26 
§12.5. Chapter 93A-Applicability to Regulated Industries. During 
the Survey year, in Lowell Gas Co. v. Attorney General,l the Supreme 
Judicial Court considered whether a regulated industry could be found 
liable under chapter 93A. The Attorney General had filed suit against 
two privately-owned gas companies alleging that these companies vio-
lated chapter 93A by allocating interest expenses for their short-tenn 
debt to the inventory cost of the fuel sold to their customers.2 This 
accounting practice was contrary .to the procedures allowed by the De-
partment of Public Utilities.3 The Attorney General further alleged that 
these practices were done knowingly and with intent to deceive the 
customers of the companies.4 The companies filed a consolidated mo-
tion to dismiss the complaints. 5 The motion to dismiss was reserved 
and reported to the Supreme Judicial Court, which held that the motion 
should be denied.6 
In denying the defendants' motion to dismiss, the Coul1t rejected the 
defendants' contention that the Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction.7 
The defendants argued that Attorney General's suit was in effect an 
impennissible collateral attack on rates lawfully promulgated by the 
however, noted that when she bought the defendant's services, the plaintiff was 
using the entire house as rental property and was thus involved in "trade or 
commerce." Thus, the plaintiff was found to be inyolved in the rental business. Id. 
23 C.L. c. 93A, §§ 9, 11. See discussion at § 3 supra. 
24 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2668, 398 N.E.2d at 487-88. 
25 Id. at 2668, 398 N.E.2d at 488. 
26 See text at note 5 supra. Notwithstanding the difficulty facing a business 
plaintiff seeking multiple damages, suoh a plaintiff is nevertheless entitled to receive 
reasonable attorney's fees and costs pursuant to seeton 9( 4) of chapter 93A. The 
Court ruled that award of such fees and costs should be available to both business 
and non-business plaintiffs who meet the requirements of section 9( 4). 1979 
Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2668, 398 N.E.2d at 488. Attorney's fees incurred with respect 
to an appeal may be included as well. Id. at 2669, 398 N.E.2d at 488. 
§12.5. 1 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. 49, 385 N.E.2d 240. 
2 Id. at 51, 385 N.E.2d at 243. 
3 Id. 
4 Id. at 53, 385 N.E.2d at 244. 
5 Id. at 50, 385 N.E.2d at 243. 
6 Id. 
7 Id. at 53, 385 N.E.2d at 244. 
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Department of Public Utilities, an area in which the department had 
exclusive jurisdiction.8 The Court, however, noted that the AttQrney 
General was not attacking the validity 'Of the depan:ment's rates. Rather, 
he was challenging practices 'Of the companies, which he claimed were 
fraudulent and deceptive toward both the companies' customers and 
the department.9 The Court then observed that there is nQthing in the 
statute regulating gas companies 10 that either explicitly or implicitly 
prevents the application of chapter 93A to the unfair or deceptive prac-
tices of gas utility companies.11 The Court nQted, by way of example, 
that it had previously held that chapter 93A was applicable to deceptive 
insurance practices, . notwithstanding the existence of a statute regulating 
insurance companies.12 Thus, the Court concluded that the mere ex-
istence of a statute regulating a public utility WQuid not bar the applica-
tion 'Of chapter 93A.18 
Mter concluding that the courts did have jurisdiction over the chapter 
93A complaints, the Court rejected the defendants' contentiQn that the 
Attorney General lacked standing to bring the chapter 93 complaints.14 
The companies argued that because they had terminated the practices 
complained 'Of before he filed the complaints, the Attorney General was 
nQt authorized to bring the complaints.15 Conceding that the Attorney 
General's complaints were ,ambiguous with regard to the continuing 
nature of the alleged fraudulent activities, the Court nevertheless con-
cluded that since the complaints ,eQuId be read tQ imply that the prac-
tices were continuing, the complaints sh'Ould survive the motion t'O dis-
miss.16 The C'Ourt, however, also added that it did not agree with the 
defendants' interpretation 'Of section 4 as precluding acti'Ons by the At-
tQrney General where the practices complained 'Of have terminated befQre 
the filing of the complaint.17 Looking t'O cases interpreting the Federal 
Trade CommissiQn Act,18 the Court found that federal courts haveal-
8Id. 
9 Id. at 54, 385 N.E.2d at 244. 
10 G.L. c. 164. 
11 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 54-55,385 N.E.2d at 244. 
12 Id. See Dodd v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 373 Mass. 359, 366 N.E.2d 
1262 (1977). 
18 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 55, 385 N.E.2d at 244. 
14 ld. at 60, 385 N.E.2d at 247. G.L. c. 93A, § 4, provides that the Attorney 
General may bring an action on behalf of the commonwealth "[w]henever the 
attorney general has reason to believe that any person is using or is about to use 
any method, act, or practice declared by section two to be unlawful, and that the 
prOceedings would be in the public interest . . .." Id. 
15 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 60, 385 N.E.2d at 247. 
16Id. 
17 ld. at 61, 385 N.E.2d at 247. 
18 G.L. c. OOA, § 2(b), directs that the courts be guided by interpretations 
given by the Federal Trade Commission and the federal courts to §5( a)( 1) of 
the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(.1) (1976). 
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lowed injunctions even where the alleged deceptive practice has been 
discontinued. 19 
Having decided that the Attorney General had standing to bring the 
chapter 93A complaints, the Court then considered the companies' con-
tention that the complaints did not state a claim upon which relief could 
be granted. 20 The Court agreed with the companies that charging rates 
set by order of the Department of Public Utilities was not wrongful and 
could not be the subject of a civil action,21 The Court stressed that 
the validity of the department's rates was not in issue. Rather, the 
Court pointed out, the gist of the complaints was that the utility com-
panies had employed deceptive practices in procuring approval of the 
rates.22 Hence, because the Attorney General's complaints concerned 
the practices employed in obtaining the approval of the rates and not 
the rates themselves, the complaints did state a cause of action.23 
§12.6. Chapter 93A-Applicability of the Medical Malpractice 
Screening Procedure. In Little v. Rosenthal 1 the Supreme Judicial 
Court considered whether a chapter 93A action brought against a 
provider of medical care was exempt from the malpraotice screening 
procedure.2 In this action the plaintiff claimed damages for personal 
injuries suffered while she was the patient of the defendant phYSician 
and was the resident of a nursing home.3 In four separate complaints, 
which were subsequently consolidated, she alleged both medical mal-
practice and violations of chapter 93A.4 The actions were referred to 
19 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 60, 385 N.E.2d at 247. The Court cited Goodman 
v. FTC, 244 F.2d 584, 593 (9th Cir. 1957), in which the federal oourt stated: 
[A]s one of the aims of the statute is to prevent unfair and deceptive practices, 
[cease and desist] orders will be sustained even when it is clearly shown that 
the practices have actually been abandoned. The cogent and obvious reason 
is that there is no guarantee that the practice might not be resumed. 
ld. at 593 (emphasis in original). 
20 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 62, 385 N.E.2d at 248. 
21 ld. at 63, 385 N.E.2d at 248. 
22 ld. 
23 ld. 
§12.6. 1 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2793, 382 N.E.2d 1037. 
2 ld. at 2796, 382 N.E.2d at 1040. C.L. c. 231, § 6OB, requires that claims 
against physicians or institutions that involve the provision of medical care must be 
screened by a panel conSisting of a judge, an attorney, and a physician before the liti-
gation can proceed in the courts. Section 60 B provides in relevant part: 
[E]very action for malpractice, error or mistake against a provider of health 
care shall be heard by a tribunal consisting of a single justice of the superior 
court, a physician . . . and an attorney . . . , at which hearing the plaintiff 
shall present an offer of proof and said tribunal &hall determine if the evidence 
presented if properly substantiated is sufficient to raise a legitimate question 
of liability . . . . 
ld. 
3 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2793, 382 N.E.2d at 1039. 
4 ld. 
16
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malpractice screening tribunals, which found the plaintiff's offer of 
proof inadequate to create any actionable issues of liability.5 
In her appeal, the plaintiff argued that actions brought under chapter 
93A were not subject to the screening procedure.6 Interpreting the 
language of section 60B of chapter 231,7 the Supreme Judicial Court 
concluded that all treatment-related claims are subjeot to malpractice 
screening tribunal review. 8 The Court noted that the legislature had 
expressly rejected language limiting the reach of the tribunal to aotions 
of tort and breach of contract and instead had adopted language mak-
ing the screening process applicable to "[e]very aotion for malpractice, 
error or mistake .... " n The Court remarked that any alternative con-
clusion would create a mechanism whereby the tribunals would be side-
stepped, thus thwarting the legislative purpose of providing a check on 
the filing of frivolous malpractice claims.10 It did indicate, however, 
that chapter 93A claims raising questions of unfair billing practices 
would not be subject to the screening tribunal's review, because they 
do not relate to any issue of medical care. l1 Thus, by its decision in 
Little, the Supreme Judicial Court has made it clear that any chapter 
93A claims against physicians or institutions involving allegations of 
improper or erroneous medical care must be reviewed by the medical 
malpractice screening tribunal. 
§12.7. Landlord-Tenant-Implied Warranty of Habitability-Strict 
Liability. In 1973 the Supreme Judicial Court in Boston Housing Au-
thority v. Hemingway 1 rejected the common law concept of a lease by 
holding that in every lease there is an implied warranty to the tenant 
that the property is fit for human habitation.2 The Court recognized 
that social changes in landlord-tenant relations and legislative changes 
in landlord obligations and tenant remedies, such as section 127 A 3 of 
chapter Ill, required a recasting of the traditional relationship of the 
parties.4 In Hemingway, the Court observed that 
5 ld. at 2793-94, 382 N.E.2d at 1039. 
6 ld. at 2796, 382 N.E.2d at 1040. 
7 For the text of § 6OB, see note 2 supra. 
8 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2796, 382 N.E.2d at 1040. 
9 ld. . 
10 ld. at 2796-97, 382 N.E.2d at 1040-41. 
11 ld. at 2797, 382 N.E.2d at 1041 (citing SDK Medical Computer Servs. Corp. 
v. Professional Operating Management Croup, Inc., 371 Mass. 117, 354 N.E.2d 852 
(1976) ). 
§12.7. 1 363 Mass. 184, 293 N.E.2d 831 (1973). 
2 ld. at 199, 293 N.E.2d at 843. 
3 ld. C.L. c. 111, § 127 A, is the current version of the State Sanitary Code. 
It imposes a duty on the landlord to maintain rental premises in habitable con-
ditions. C.L. c. 239, § 8A, discusses self-help through rent withholding. 
4 363 Mass. at 199, 293 N.E.2d at 843. 
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a lease is essentially a contract between the landlord and the tenant 
wherein the landlord promises to deliver and maintain the demised 
premises in habitable condition and the tenant promises to pay 
rent for such habitable premises. These promises constitute inter-
dependent and mutual considerations. Thus, the tenant's obliga-
tion to pay rent is predicated on the landlord's obligation to deliver 
and maintain the premises in habitable condition.!; 
A breach of this implied warranty could result in a rent abatement, 
equal to the difference between the fair rental value of the apartment 
as warranted and the reasonable value of the apartment in its defective 
conditiQn.u During the Survey period, the Supreme Judicial Court ruled 
that this abatement could be had regardless of the landlord's fault and! or 
his reasonable efforts to repair. 
Berman & Sons, Inc. v. Jefferson 7 involved a tenant's claim that the 
landlord had failed to provide adequate heat and hot water. As a 
result, the tenant withheld $35 from one month's rent of $245.8 The 
landlord refused to accept her payment and brought an eviction action.9 
The tenant counterclaimed, alleging, inter alia, a breach of the implied 
warranty of habitability.10 The trial judge denied the landlord posses-
sion and ordered him to pay $3lO in damages for the breach. The 
judge did not find that the landlord had acted intentionally, negligently, 
or in bad faith.l1 The landlord appealed, claiming that the tenant was 
obligated for the full measure of rent where the landlord was without 
fault and,. alternatively, that the tenant was obligated for the total rent 
until the landlord had had a reasonable opportunity to remedy the 
breaches.12 On appeal, the Supreme JudiCial Court affirmed.13 
At the outset, the Court rejected the landlord's claim that a tenant 
must pay full rent without abatement when the landlord's failure to 
maintain a dwelling was not attributable to fault or bad faith. The 
Court held that "the tenant's obligation abates as soon as the landlord 
has notice that premises fail to comply with the requirements of the 
warranty of habitability. The landlord's lack of fault and reasonable 
efforts to repair do not prolong the duty to pay full rent." 14 Referring 
5 ld. at 198, 293 N.E.2d at 842. 
6 ld. at 203, 293 N .E.2d at 845. 
7 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2459, 396 N.E.2d 981. 
8 ld. at 2460, 396 N.E.2d at 983. 
9 ld. 
10 ld. 
11 ld. 
12 ld. 
13 ld. 
14 ld. at 2460-61, 396 N.E.2d at 983. 
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extensively to Boston Housing Authority v. Hemingway,15 the Court 
concluded that considerations of fault have no bearing on issues of 
breaches of warranty, particularly when the warranty is one of habit-
ability of a dwelling place.16 The justices recognized the existence of 
an interdependence between habitability and the payment of rentP 
They also noted that just as a tenant would not be excused if he made 
merely a reasonable attempt to pay rent, so a landlord should nDt be 
excused if he made merely a reasonable effDrt tD provide a habitable 
apartment.18 Accordingly, the CDurt confirmed that a tenant's 'Obliga-
tion to pay rent abates if the landlord breaches his obligatiDn to provide 
a habitable dwelling, regardless of absence 'Of fault on the landlord's 
part. 
Having cDnfirmed the tenant's right to abate rent onoe the warranty 
of habitability was breaohed, the Court then determined that a breach 
in effect occurs as SDon as the landlord has notice of the defect.19 Thus, 
the tenant's 'Obligation abates from this point.20 The Court rejected the 
landlord's claim that the breach becDmes actual 'Only after the landlord 
has been given a reasonable time to repair.21 It nDted that the purpose 
of the notice requirement was not to assure the landlord of reasonable 
time to repair but to "minimize the time the ,landlord is in breach and 
hence mitigate the permissible period 'Of abatement 'Of rent." 22 Recog-
nizing the eoonDmic burden imposed upon the landlord, the Court 
nevertheless emphaSized that the burden imposed upDn the tenant was 
considerably greater-the loss of shelter.23 Thus, in the Court's view, 
permitting the tenant to abate rent as soon as the landlDrd receives 
notice of a defect in the rental property furthers the policy enunciated 
in Hemingway of assuring that a landlord provide property suitable fDr 
habitatiDn.24 
§12.8. Legislation. During the Survey year the legislature enacted 
substantial modifications in chapter 93A, the Consumer PrDtection Act. 
Section 9, which previously had limited rights of action to persons WhD 
were either purchasers or lessees, 1 has been broadened to allDW a claim 
15 363 Mass. 184, 293 N.E.2d 831 (1973). 
16 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2462, 396 N.E.2d at 984. 
17 ld. at 2461, 396 N.E.2d at 984. 
18 ld. at 2464, 396 N.E.2d at 985. 
19 ld. at 2460-61, 396 N.E.2d at 983. 
20ld. 
21 ld. at 2464-65, 396 N.E.2d at 985-86. 
22 ld. at 2466, 396 N.E.2d at 986. 
23 ld. at 2463, 396 N .E.2d at 984-85. 
24 ld. at 2467, 396 N.E.2d at 986. See Boston Hous. Auth. v. Hemingway, 363 
Mass. 184, 196-97, 293 N.E.2d 831, 841-42 (1973). 
§12.8. 1 C.L. c. 93A, § 9( 1). 
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by any person who has been injured by the use of an unfair or deceptive 
aot or practice.2 Section 9(1), as amended, now provides that 
(1) [a]ny person, other than a person entitled to bring action 
under section eleven of this chapter, who has been injured by an-
other person's use or employment of any method, act or practice 
declared to be unlawful by section two or any rule or regulation 
issued thereunder or any person whose rights are affected by an-
other person violating the provisions of clause (9) of section three 
of chapter one hundred and seventy-six D may bring an action . 
for damages and such equitable relief, including an injunction, as 
the court deems to be necessary and proper. 3 
The prior requirement that only consumers who had purchased goods 
or services could employ the remedial provisions of section 9 has been 
deleted. Thus, this modification eliminates the defense that certain in-
dustries are not subject to chapter 93A claims because they do not 
market goods or services.4 
In addition to eliminating the purchaser /lessee requirement, the 
amendment removes the precondition that a consumer must incur a 
loss of money or property before he can sue under the provisions of 
chapter 93A. The old requirement of actual loss operated as a bar to 
numerous potential actions and thus lessened the impact of section 9 
as a remedial tool to discourage unfair practices.5 The previous statu-
tory requirement that there be an actual loss of money or property has 
resulted in at least one unsatisfactory court decision in the past. The 
Court acknowledged its dissatisfaction in Baldassari v. Public Finance 
Trust,6 where it reluctantly ruled that the allegation of emotional dis-
tress resulting from acts potentially violative of chapter 93A did not 
satisfy the requirement of a loss of money or property.7 Chapter 406 
2 Acts of 1979, c. 406. 
3 C.L. c. 93A, § 9(1), as amended by Acts of 1979, c. 406. 
4 See Mechanics Nat'l Bank of Worcester v. Killeen, 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. 129, 
384 N .E.2d 1231. The Court raised the question of whether the language "pur-
chases or leases goods, services or property" can be properly interpreted to include 
banking activities. Id. at 140-41 n.B, 384 N.E.2d 1237-38 n.B. 
5 For example, under the pre-amendment provisions of § 9, a suit could not be 
maintained by individuals who had seen, but had not believed, deceptive advertise-
ments, because they had not lost any money as a result of the deception. Likewise, a 
consumer who encounters an unscrupulous salesperson in a store, but leaves without 
buying any goods, would be without recourse under the Consumer Protection Act. 
In each of these examples, the consumer would have to find and allege some damage 
resulting from the unfair act before the remedial provisions, including injunctions, 
would be available. 
6 369 Mass. 33, 337 N.E.2d 701 (1975). 
7 Id. at 44-46,337 N.E.2d at 70B. The Baldassaris complained that the defendant 
had engaged in numerous unfair debt collection practices in violation of C.L. c. 
93, § 49, and that, as a result, they had suffered severe emotional distress. Id. at 
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of the Acts of 1979 alleviated this problem by changing the requirement 
that the oonsumer prove a loss of money or property to one that the 
consumer make a showing that the consumer has been "injured." 8 
During the Survey year there were also several amendments to sec-
tions 9 and 11 of chapter 93A. By virtue of chapter 72 of the Acts of 
1979, actions brought under sections 9 and 11 may now be maintained 
in housing court." The amendment was enaoted in response to two 
recent Supreme Judicial Court decisions which held that the statute 
then in effect did not permit the maintenance of chapter 93A actions 
in housing court.l0 Chapter 93A has also been amended to include a 
new provision for the initiation of chapter 93A aotions by way of 
counterclaims, cross-claims, or third-party claims.n Another amend-
ment clarifies this procedure by stating that the demand requirements 
of section 9( 3) are not applicable to counterclaims or cross-claims.12 
Paragraph (3A) has been added to section 9 to allow for the initiation 
of chapter 93A actions in the district courts,13 These district court ac-
tions are limited to claims for money and may not include requests for 
equitable relief or for certification of class membership,u 
In addition to amending existing sections of chapter 93A, the legisla-
ture also enacted two entirely new sections. Chapter 214 of the Acts 
of 1979 codifies the rights of patients in hospitals, nursing homes, and 
other health institutions.15 These include, inter alia, the right of: 
37, 337 N.E.2d at 704. Since C.L. c. 93, § 49, makes any violation of that law 
a concurrent violation of C.L. c. 93A, the Baldassaris commenced a class aotion 
under the provisions of § 9. Id. at 45, 337 N.E.2d at 709. The Court, while 
sympathetic to the plaintiffs' plight, ruled that chapter 93A relief was not available, 
since severe emotional distress did not constitute a loss of money or property. Id. 
at 44-45, 337 N.E.2d at 708-09. 
8 C.L. c. 93A, § 9(1), as amended by Acts of 1979, c. 406. 
!I C.L. c. 93A, § 9 (1), as amended by Acts of 1979, c. 406; C.L. c. 93A, § 11, 
as amended by Acts of 1979, c. 72, respectively. Pursuant to both these sections, 
a plaintiff may now bring an action in either the superior court or the housing court. 
10 Haas v. Breton, 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. 757, 387 N.E.2d 138; Chakrabarti v. 
Marinello Assocs., Inc., 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. 537, 386 N.E.2d 1248. 
n C.L. c. 93A, § 9( 1), as amended by Acts of 1978, c. 478. 
12 C.L. c. 93A, § 9(3), as amended by Acts of 1979, c. 406. A party complained 
against may avoid multiple damages and some attorney's fees by making a written 
offer of relief and paying the rejected tender into court as soon as practicable after 
receiving notice of the counterclaim or cross-olaim. Id. 
13 C.L. C. 93A, § 9(3A), as enacted by Acts of 1978, C. 478. 
14 Id. Decisions relative to remand, removal, and transfer are to be controlled 
by the amount claimed as Single damages. Thus, it appears that a claimant may 
receive as much as $2,250 (3 x $750) in a small claims court action brought 
unde.r chapter 93A. 
15 C.L. C. 111, § 70E, as enacted by Acts of 1979, C. 214, as amended by Acts 
of 1979, C. 720. 
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( 1) freedom of choice in selecting a facility or physician; 
(2) receipt of itemized bills; 
( 3) confidentiality of records and communications; 
( 4) inspection of medical records; 
§12.8 
( 5) refusal to allow observation or treatment by students or other 
staff; 
( 6) refusal to serve as a research or educational subject; 
(7) privacy during treatment; and 
(8) informed consent to the extent prOVided by law. 
Chapter 608 of the Acts of 1979 added seotion 49A to chapter 93. This 
new statute requires that retail trade reporting agencies must disclose 
to a requesting retail business the nature, content, and substance of any 
information transmitted to third parties. 10 This section thereby creates 
a limited fair credit reporting act for retail merchants,17 and makes 
available to them the remedies of chapter 93A. 
It appears from this brief review of the legislative amendments to 
the Consumer Protection Act that a major characteristic of the various 
amendments is that they expand the rights of the "consumer" as against 
businesses engaging in unfair practices. As a result of these amend-
ments, the group of potential plaintiffs has expanded, and chapter 93A 
claims can now be raised in a greater number of courts. \Vhen chapter 
93A was originally enacted it stated that its policy was to achieve "a 
more equitable balance in the relationship of consumers to persons con-
ducting business aotivities." 18 Similar concern for businessmen was 
later manifested when chapter 93A conferred a right of action on busi-
nessmen.1!! The substantive modifications to chapter 93A that have 
occurred during this Survey period have served to achieve this policy 
goal. 
16 C.L. c. 93, § 49A, as enacted by Acts of 1979, c. 608. Section 49A states: 
Eve'ry retail trade reporting agency which discloses to any third person infonna-
tion concerning a business engaged in retail trade shall, upon request of such 
business, disclose to it the nature, contents and substance of such infonnation 
contained in its files at the time of the request. Whoever fails to comply 
with the provisions of this section shall . . . be deemed to have committed 
an unfair or deceptive act or practice prohibited by chapter ninety-three A. 
ld. A retail trade reporting agency is defined as "any person, finn, association or 
corporation which for monetary fees or dues, regularly engages, in whole or in 
pal1t, in the practice of assembling or evaluating trade or other infonnation on a 
business engaged in retail ,trade for the purpose of furnishing reports on such busi-
ness to third parties." ld. 
17 See C.L. c. 93, §§ 50-68, for consumer credit reporting requirements. 
18 Levings v. Forbes & Wallace, Inc., 1979 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 2046, 
396 N.E.2d at 152 (citing Commonwealth v. DeCotis, 366 Mass. 234, 238, 316 
N.E.2d 748, 752 (1974». 
19 C.L. c. 93A, as enacted by Acts of 1972, c. 614, § 2. 
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